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Abstract
How do the words we use to talk about politics influence political attitudes and evaluations? I
focus specifically on negative affective language; words which individuals have pre-existing
negative reactions towards. Considering the Affect Infusion Model (AIM), processing style
influences how individuals use affect when making decisions. The impact of affective language
depends upon the complexity of the decision. In simpler processing tasks, individuals will use
affect as a heuristic. This causes a misattribution of generalized negative affect onto a political
target, leading to harsher evaluations. When a decision is complex, affective language influences
how new information is stored in memory, along with improving information recall and abstract
thinking. For those who are exposed to negative affective language, negative evaluations of
politicians persist more strongly in memory, while these evaluations fade away when affect is
used as a heuristic.
“Lightweight choker Marco Rubio looks like a little boy on stage. Not presidential material!” – Donald Trump1
The words used to describe politics are often strong and affect-laden, though it is unclear how this language influences
public opinion. This has perhaps never been so apparent than in the 2016 Presidential campaign of Donald Trump.
Trump routinely calls his opponents lightweights, chokers, losers and liars – all words that individuals have strong
negative reactions towards. I argue that these words, or negative affective language, will influence how the public
makes decisions about policies and political figures, above and beyond the effects of pure negativity. When Trump
characterizes Rubio as a choker, or Ted Cruz as a liar, or Jeb Bush as a loser, he uses words that individuals have preexisting negative reactions towards. These words should be more powerful than simply criticizing an opponent’s
policy or record, as they should create connections between the politician and ideas that individuals already have about
things they do not like. For example, seeing a political figure described as a “cancer” will activate negative thoughts
one has stored about cancer, inducing a generalized negative mood. Such negative affective words are words which
individuals have negative reactions towards, regardless of context (Bradley and Lang 1999). The negative mood
created by these words should be misattributed to the political concepts that are described using affective language.
The context of the decision matters as well. When a decision is simple, affective language influences decision making
in the short term; while the negative mood persists, the political figures will be judged more harshly, though this effect
will not continue for very long. When a decision is more difficult to make, affective language will influence how
information is stored in memory, which leads to longer lasting effects on political judgments.
Political language has recently been shown to frequently have an affective component. From traditional media such
as the New York Times (Young and Soroka 2011) to newer media such as political blogs and Twitter (Vatrapu et al.
2009; Tumasjan et al. 2010), political information often takes on an affective tone, which is more often than not
negative. Negative information has been shown to have a considerably stronger effect on attitudes than positive
1

Quoted from a tweet on February 26, 2016.
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information (Pratto and John 1991; Baumeister et al. 2001), especially negative political information (Miller 2010;
Redlawsk, Civettini and Emmerson 2010). However, negative information need not always be overt. Negative rhetoric
about a politician or policy should be impactful, but the words chosen to describe political events should matter as
well. I argue that using negative affective language, for example, referring to a debate as “ugly” rather than
“contentious,” will induce a negative mood in individuals, making negative information more powerful.
If political decision making is being influenced by affective language, this brings to light important normative concerns
for political scientists, and anyone interested in politics generally. Typically, the role of generalized affect in decision
making is operationalized as a diffuse mood created by something clearly irrelevant to politics, and often out of the
control of political elites. However, political news or rhetoric that uses affective language is not as plainly irrelevant,
and can easily be manipulated by political elites. If politicians can use language to create a mood that makes the masses
like them more, or their opponents less, this is problematic for democracy. The use of affective language also may
have unintended consequences for politicians who make attacks. This may be seen anecdotally in the 2016 campaign.
While Trump has been successful in securing the Republican nomination, he also has to deal with unprecedented
unfavorability ratings. If affective language creates a generalized negative mood, it should lead to more negative
evaluations of all politicians involved, whether it is a campaign attack or a single politician criticizing a bill. This goes
beyond previous research on negativity, such as backlash effects on accusers (see Garramone 1984), as negative mood
should effect all candidates equally. I examine distinct situations where affective language should matter, and
processing style should differ: in evaluations of a negatively assessed policy and in evaluations of political candidates
involved in campaign mudslinging.
How Affect Influences Judgments – The Affect Infusion Model
When individuals are asked to arrive at an opinion about a political object, they will draw on the various considerations
about that object they have in their minds (Zaller 1992). When individuals receive political information intertwined
with affective language, this language should create a particular mood, giving them another consideration that seems
relevant. The affect infusion model (AIM) specifies the conditions under which individuals adopt particular cognitive
strategies, and how affect operates in these contexts (Forgas 1995). The AIM has two key assumptions about
judgments: that the influence of mood on judgment is dependent upon the information processing strategy used, and
that individuals will adopt the least effortful processing strategy possible (Forgas 1995). Mood is likely to influence
decision making in circumstances in which an open, constructive style of information processing is used (Fiedler
1991). Indeed, more complex or atypical processing tasks have been found to increase the influence of affect on
judgments (Fiedler 1991, Forgas 1992). Considering these assumptions, one must consider what processing strategies
are available, and which strategies would make affect infusion more or less likely to occur.
A simple form of information processing is heuristic processing, which occurs when a target is simple or typical and
the judgment is not highly personally relevant to an individual (Forgas 1995). Heuristic processing is not a deep
processing style, and individuals using heuristic processing typically lack the motivation, resources, or both to engage
in deeper processing (Schwarz and Clore 1983, Eich et al. 2008). This processing is still open and constructive, since
individuals lack prior information on which to base their judgment, but they are still trying to arrive at a judgment
with minimal effort (Forgas 1995, Paulhus and Lim 1994). In this situation, affective states can influence judgment.
Individuals often think “how do I feel about this?” as a heuristic, and this heuristic serves to guide their opinions
(Schwarz and Clore 1988, Clore and Isbell 2001). In heuristic processing affective states guide judgments through a
misattribution of feelings. If an individual is able to adopt a heuristic processing style, considering the goal of effort
minimization, it should be adopted over a more complex processing strategy. When individuals engage in heuristic
processing, negative affective language should make political evaluations more negative in the short term, but not in
the long term, as little effort is being expended in the decision making process. Some judgment tasks, however, are
not conducive to heuristic processing, and a constructive processing style must be adopted.
When a task is demanding or complex, individuals must adopt a constructive processing strategy (Forgas 1995).
Constructive processing is the most effortful form of processing, and is “adopted only when simpler and less effortful
processing strategies prove inadequate to the judgmental task” (Forgas 1995, p. 47). The AIM predicts that, when
constructive processing is used, affect infusion and mood congruence should increase since the judgment requires
more effortful and elaborate information processing (Forgas 1995, Eich et al. 2008). Since individuals retrieve
information that is congruent with their current affective state (Bower 1981), this should create an even stronger
influence of mood than when individuals use less effortful heuristic processing.
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Still, the effect of mood may be different: those who engage in less effortful processing should use their feelings only
as a heuristic. In constructive processing, decisions are not arrived at as easily. Mood is likely to bias the search for
information in one’s memory, but given the more effortful cognitive processing, the use of mood as a heuristic for
judgments could be muted. However, information should be encoded in memory more congruently with one’s mood.
While affective language might influence quick judgments more strongly, affective language in a constructive
processing scenario may have more long term consequences for politicians, since new information about them will be
encoded more negatively when negative affective language is used 2.
Considering this, affect should influence judgments and behaviors differently depending on the processing style used.
In heuristic processing, individuals make only a partial, or possibly no, search for more information in memory, while
in constructive processing, individuals make an extensive and detailed search in memory (Forgas 1995). Negative
affect, in particular, should have distinct consequences for how information is processed under effortful processing.
Negative information is easier for individuals to recall (Baumeister et al. 2001). When in a negative mood, individuals
have a stronger focus on searching memory for external information (Bless and Fiedler 2006). Negative affect also
improves both the coding and retrieval of information in memory (Forgas, Laham, and Vargas 2005; Forgas,
Goldenberg, and Unkelbach 2008), and increases cognitive elaboration (Bless et al. 1990). Negative affect has distinct
consequences for constructive information processing: individuals should better recall information and also recall
more external information they deem relevant to the judgment at hand.
This relates to work by Daniel Kahneman on System 1 and System 2 information processing. Kahneman argues that
System 1 processing is fast, automatic and emotional, while System 2 processing is slow, effortful and logical
(Kahneman 2011). However, if affect is truly infused with how judgements are formed, it may be difficult for
individuals to separate these affective judgments even when engaged in a constructive, system 2 type of processing.
When new information is stored in memory, under the Affect Infusion Model, this information is stored with the
affective judgments individuals have made about it (Forgas 1995, Eich et al. 2008). In this case, even logical
processing should be driven by affect indirectly. If affect influences how information is stored, this should be seen as
“facts” by an individual when they retrieve this information. Considering these two models, when an individual makes
quick judgments, affect is simply a heuristic. When individuals make slower, more effortful judgments, affect should
influence judgments to the extent that it influences how information is stored in memory.
Affect has been shown to be influence judgment in many scenarios. Negative moods induced by various external
means, including the weather, sporting events or films, cause individuals to evaluate their own lives more negatively
(Forgas and Bower 1987, Forgas and Moylan 1987, Schwarz and Clore 1983, Schwarz et al. 1987), and negative
external events have been shown to decrease support for incumbent politicians (Achen and Bartels n.d., Healy,
Malhotra and Mo 2010). Priming individuals with a negative word, or with a photo of a prominent politician, can
influence evaluations of other political candidates (Weinberger and Westen 2008). Brader (2006) finds that cues to
discrete emotions like enthusiasm and fear can influence political attitudes, but his work focuses on discrete emotions
rather than generalized affect. Fighting words, or violent metaphors, can increase preference for violent political
action, especially among those with high levels of trait aggression (Kalmoe 2014). From this work, it is clear that both
generalized affect and word choice matter in how political attitudes develop, but the two avenues of research have
remained disconnected.
This research, however, often focuses on mood inductions that are artificial or out of control of political elites, or
focuses on manipulation of discrete emotions. Here, I extend these applications to examine the words used in political
rhetoric to determine how words that do not focus on discrete emotions can influence political attitudes.

2

Previous research on effortful thinking suggests that this type of information processing leads to higher quality decision making. The elaboration
likelihood model of information processing suggests individuals are motivated to make correct decisions, and that more effortful information
processing leads to better decision making (Petty and Cacioppo 1981). Here, I make no judgment of the quality of decision making when
constructive processing strategies are used. The AIM suggests that affect will bias information search, though this does not need to stand in conflict
with this work. An individual’s mood can simply lead them to believe that certain types of information in memory are more relevant to the current
judgment task than others, or that certain types of information are more convincing than others.
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How Affective Language Influences Political Judgments
Considering the AIM framework3, the use of affective language in political communication should influence both
political judgments and how political information is processed. Depending on the processing style, affect will
influence judgment in different ways: it will happen either directly through affect or indirectly through how new
information is encoded in memory and how old information is retrieved (Forgas 1995). This research will provide a
new, more subtle examination of how affect can be infused with information received by an individual, and one that
is especially relevant to politics. Rather than focusing on external or artificial mood manipulations, this study will
examine real ways that political elites can use language to manipulate the mood of those consuming political
information.
I present results from two different experiments on affective language. I examine situations where I would expect
either heuristic or constructive processing styles to be used. When heuristic processing is used, I expect that affect
will influence judgments directly; when individuals are exposed to negative affective language, this will lead to more
negative evaluations of political objects. However, I do not expect negative affective language to have any influence
on how information is retrieved from, or stored in, memory. Since little to no information needs to be retrieved from
memory to make the judgments, those who receive negative affective language will perform similarly on a memory
task compared to those who receive neutral language. In a more difficult scenario, where I would expect constructive
processing to be used, I also expect that judgments of a political object will be harsher when subjects are exposed to
negative affective language compared to neutral language. However, I expect this effect to be more indirect. Given
the difficulty of the decision task, individuals will think more about the decision and search their memories for relevant
information. When constructive processing is used, I expect individuals not only to think more about their decisions,
but also to pull in more external information and remember more factual information, since affect should improve
memory and lead to a more detailed information search (Forgas 1995, Isen 1984, Pham 2009).
Study 1 – Affect and Heuristic Processing
Subjects were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk on November 9th and 10th, 2011. Subjects were offered $1
to complete an omnibus study on public opinion; 316 subjects participated in the negative affective language portion
of the study4. Subjects on Mechanical Turk have been shown to be more representative of the United States than most
in-person convenience samples, even though they are typically younger, more liberal, and less wealthy (Berinsky,
Huber and Lenz 2012). This is true of that current sample, with a mean age of about 34 and 50% of subjects identifying
as at least somewhat liberal, with only 28% identifying as at least somewhat conservative 5. Samples drawn from
Mechanical Turk have been shown to replicate important findings in political science and psychology (see Berinsky,
Huber and Lenz 2012).
In Study 1, subjects were assigned to one of two experimental groups. All subjects read a fictional news article 6 about
a voter identification law that they were told was being considered in another state. The tone of this article was always
negative towards the law, even in the neutral language control group. The tone of the article is kept negative, even in
the control group, to better test the mechanism of negative affective language. I predict that negative affective words
should be more negative than neutral affective words, even when the overall tone of an article remains negative. To
isolate this mechanism, the tone of the control text is kept negative, to avoid confounding the effects of negative
affective words with a generalized negative tone. In the treatment article 18 words 7 with a negative affective valence
were included to replace 18 words with a neutral affective valence. These are words that individuals have been shown
to have strong negative reactions towards, as coded in the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) database (see
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I use a valence model for affect rather than examining discrete emotions. This valence model focuses on simple negative or positive reactions,
rather than a discrete emotional response. Models of affect and its influence on information processing focus on a diffuse mood, rather than a
discrete response to a particular object (Bower 1981). This is an important distinction; given that I argue an affective response is created by
language, a targeted emotional response would be directed at words rather than the political target.
4
154 subjects were assigned to the neutral language control group and 162 were assigned to the negative emotional language treatment group.
5
The mean for ideology, on a 7 point liberal to conservative scale, is 3.51. 55% of subjects are female, and 46% have a bachelor’s degree. About
6% of the sample is African-American, and 4.8% Hispanic.
6
Treatment texts from study 1 are available in Appendix A.
7
Each article contains approximately 250 words, so only about 7% of the words in each article are replaced between the control and treatment
groups.
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Bradley and Lang 1999)8. The negative words have an average ANEW valence rating of about 2.22 (s.d. 0.47),
considerably lower than the neutral score of 5.0. This differs from standard mood inductions, which typically do not
occur at the same time that information is provided. Here, I argue that mood is not specific because the affective
language is not targeted at anything in particular: it is difficult for an individual to determine whether their negative
feelings are directed at the bill itself, its supporters, or its opposition.
In this study, I expect subjects will engage in heuristic processing. While voter identification laws have been
considered or enacted in many states, it is an issue that has not been on the agenda for a very long time and one that
is of relatively minor importance in people’s day to day lives. In this study, all subjects read an article that is opposed
to the Voter ID law. If subjects have limited information about Voter ID laws, this negatively framed article should
guide all subjects to evaluate the law negatively. However, I argue that negative affective language provides another
piece of negative information about the law: an individual’s mood. This should lead to more negative evaluations in
the treatment group.
First, I examine how negative affect influences assessments of two political objects, the proposed Voter ID law and
the fictional politician, Ben Griffin, mentioned in the news article. There was a difference between the negative
language treatment and neutral language control groups in ideology, with the treatment group being more conservative.
Given that the Voter ID legislation has a distinct ideological base of support in conservatives, the lack of balance on
political ideology between treatment and control groups could bias my results. Additionally, this lack of balance on
ideology is unexpected, and could indicate a lack of balance on unobservable variables. To minimize this bias, I
present results controlling for all observed variables9 in the study. These results are presented in table I.
(Table I about here)
On support for the Voter ID act10, subjects in the negative affective language condition are significantly less likely to
support the act than those in the neutral language control group. This effect, while small, is still substantively
important, with those in the treatment rating their support of the law nearly seven points lower than those in the control.
To put the size of this effect into perspective, the negative affective language treatment results in an effect on support
of the Voter ID law larger than that of gender, being African-American, living in state that has enacted a Voter ID
law, and a move from the minimum to maximum values of education and political knowledge.
For politician support, I find a similar pattern. Support for Ben Griffin on a 0-100 feeling thermometer decreases by
over 4 points for those in the negative affect language group, compared to the neutral language control. While this
effect is again rather small, it is over 40% of the magnitude of the effect of moving from very liberal to very
conservative. Further, this effect is especially profound when considering that those in the treatment group support
Griffin’s stance on the Voter ID act more than those in the control. Given that this is the only information they have
about Griffin’s ideology, these results suggest that feelings matter when individuals are asked to evaluate political
figures. Subjects may agree with Griffin more on policy in the treatment group, but they still rate him more negatively
on a feeling thermometer. This suggests that negative affect 11 is not targeted at the law itself, but is used to bias all
judgments made about the information learned in the article.
Next, I turn to the open-ended responses to assess how information was stored in memory. I asked participants to list
any thoughts that came to mind when they considered the Voter ID law. These responses were coded to identify
predicted observable implications from the AIM for different processing styles. For example, negative affective
language should influence memory recall and coding: thus, I have coded whether individuals recalled basic
information from the article, or made a negative judgment of the Voter ID law. Since heuristic processing should be
adopted, I expect there to be no difference between the treatment and control groups in these responses. Individuals

8

In the ANEW database, Bradley and Lang (1999) rate over 1000 English words on the dimensions of valence, arousal and dominance. I focus on
the valence, or positive/negative, dimension. Words are rated on a scale of 1-9, with words rated closer to one highly negative, closer to nine highly
positive, and those rated near five neutral.
9
All control variables, with the exception of age, are coded 0-1. Balance checks on demographic variables are included in Appendix B.
10
Support for the Voter ID Act was assessed on a 0-100 scale, with 100 indicating the highest level of support.
11
Unfortunately, I did not measure negative affect in this study. However, in study 2, I do find increased negative affect among the treatment group.
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are using affect as a heuristic, rather than having it influence their search in memory while deciding what conclusion
to arrive at. Table II12 presents the differences in the first three responses 13 to the open-ended question about the Voter
ID law that subjects read about.
(Table II about here)
There is little discernible difference between those who read the story with negative affective language and those who
read the story with neutral language on these measures. In both groups, subjects wrote approximately 130 characters,
or roughly 43 characters per response, suggesting that negative affect does not spur increased cognitive elaboration in
this processing task. They were also equally likely to make at least one mention of a topic not mentioned in the article,
with about 55% of subjects in each group saying at least one thing 14 about an outside topic. Here, I code outside
mentions as any reference to something not directly mentioned in the article; these responses typically included
references to other places where identification was required, claims about which political party supported or opposed
the law, or claims of potential racial bias in the law. Between both groups, roughly 26% of individuals were able to
repeat a statement made in the article, such as the law’s effect on the poor and elderly and problems with fraud in
absentee voting. Here, I coded mentions of factual statements in the article as being made if subjects mentioned a topic
that was discussed in the text of both articles15.
Lastly, I look at instances where subjects made a statement in the open-ended responses that was negative towards the
Voter ID law. Here, I code negative responses as any instance where subjects mention that they dislike or are opposed
to the law. Interestingly, there was a slightly higher proportion of individuals in the neutral language control who
expressed a negative opinion of the law than those in the negative language treatment (though, this difference does
not approach statistical significance), 46% to 42%. This suggests that the previous responses about support of the law
and Ben Griffin were not results of a deep thought process, but instead were quick decisions made using affect as a
heuristic16. Negative affect should lead to more considerations of external information (Bless and Fiedler 2006) and
better recall of relevant information (Forgas, Laham, and Vargas 2005) when a more effortful processing approach is
taken. Here, we see that is simply not the case, suggesting that individuals are using the faster, more superficial
heuristic processing style when making this judgment. It appears that subjects are not attaching their feelings to the
Voter ID law when storing it in memory, causing the influence of affective language to dissipate when they are later
asked to engage in a more cognitively challenging task.
Study 2 – Affect and Constructive Processing
For study 2, subjects were recruited both on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and from undergraduate political science
courses at a private, Southern university in March 2012. Subjects from Mechanical Turk were paid $2.50 for an
omnibus study on public opinion, which took about 30 minutes to complete. Student subjects completed the same
study in a laboratory on campus in exchange for course credit. A total of 281 student subjects and 248 non-students
completed the study, for a total n of 529 subjects17. Of these, 426 were assigned to either the treatment or control
group for the current study18. Subjects were rather similar across the two modes of study with regards to gender, race
and ideology – approximately 53% of subjects were female, 7% African-American, 5% Hispanic and both groups
leaned slightly liberal, though not largely so. As expected, there were differences in age; subjects on Mechanical Turk
had an average age of about 35, while subjects in the lab had an average age of about 20.

Regression models with a full set of controls provide similar results, and are available in the reviewer’s appendix.
Subjects could give a maximum of seven total responses. For ease of comparability to Study 2, I have restricted this analysis only to the first
three responses.
14
Here, I look at the proportions of individuals who mentioned a topic not in the article, recalled a fact from the article, or said something negative
about the law in at least one of the first three responses, compared to those who made no mention of these.
15
I excluded, for example, references to “dead” voters, since it is unclear if that is mentioning an abstract thought (in the control group) or recalling
information (in the treatment group).
16
One could argue that negative affective language simply provides a stronger information signal than neutral language. In this instance, I would
expect voters to use that information in their free responses – since they have learned more negative information about the law than the control
group, they should continue to evaluate the law more negatively even with a more complex task.
17
In all analyses in this section, I pool subjects from the student and mturk samples. Statistical analyses on each sample individually provide similar
results. Subjects in the lab were more like to recall information and mention abstract information than those on Mturk, while those on Mturk were
more likely to make a negative comment about the politicians than those in the lab. In both groups, the treatment effect was similar.
18
Subjects that did not receive an article about the political scandal are excluded from analysis.
12
13
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In this study, subjects were first presented with brief background information about two candidates, Eric Thomas and
Arthur Spencer, that they were told were competing in a gubernatorial election in a different state 19. Afterwards,
subjects were presented an article to provide them more information about this election. While the overall content and
information presented in both articles was similar, subjects were randomly assigned to receive an article about
accusations of a political scandal with neutral affective language, or a similar article including negative affective
language, a design similar to that of study 1. Here, 36 words 20 were replaced in the treatment article. These words
have an average ANEW valence rating of 2.37 (s.d. 0.55), similar to the average rating in study 1 and again, far
towards the negative end of the nine point ANEW valence rating scale.
I expect that this study will present subjects with a more difficult judgment task than the previous study; here, subjects
are presented with accusations of corruption against Spencer by Thomas; Spencer then denies these charges. This
judgment task is designed to be difficult – there is no certainty as to which politician is telling the truth, forcing subjects
to make that evaluation on their own. Given that this is a fictional election, subjects have no pre-existing attitudes
towards the election, making the task more challenging. Because of this, subjects must spend some time deliberating
– there are no easy cues such as proof of who is correct or partisanship upon which to base their decisions. Such
deliberation, however, has been shown to have no effect on the quality of decision making (Jackman and Sniderman
2006); suggesting that, in this context, subjects may be especially confused on who to believe. Since I expect a
constructive processing style to be adopted, subjects will make a detailed search in their memory when making
evaluations (Forgas 1995). As such, I predict that affect will influence what subjects think about when considering
this election and, contrary to a heuristic processing situation, cause differences between conditions on what they think
about in regards to the election in an open-ended response task.
(Table III about here)
In this study, I included a PANAS scale to measure negative affect; this scale features five questions to measure
negative affect that have been shown to be highly reliable (see Watson, Clark and Tellegen 1988). To measure
generalized negative affect, subjects were asked to report the extent to which they felt afraid, upset, nervous, scared
and distressed at that very moment, and responses to these five questions were used to create an additive index to
measure negative affect21. Individuals in the negative affective language group report significantly higher levels of
negative affect. This effect is rather small, a difference of only about .5 on the 20 point scale (p~.06, one-tailed),
though overall levels of self-reported negative affect tended to be low across groups. Despite this difference in affect,
table III shows little difference between the negative affective language and neutral language groups in their
evaluations of the two candidates, Arthur Spencer and Eric Thomas 22. Here, both candidates are rated, on average,
near the midpoint of the feeling thermometer across groups, and subjects are roughly equally likely to say they would
vote for Spencer or Thomas.
Why does negative affective language not lead to harsher evaluations of the political candidates on these standard
survey measures? Here, it is possible that affect is simply not being used as a heuristic, which is exactly what would
be expected in constructive processing, where individuals think more deeply about judgments and do not simply ask
how they feel about objects (Forgas 1995, Eich et al. 2008). In examining the open-ended responses from subjects, it
does appear that many take sides in the election, choosing to believe either Spencer or Thomas 23. However, which
candidate subjects support is not being influenced by the affective language treatment. Along these lines, effortful
thinking has been shown to increase ambivalence with regards to candidate preferences (Rudolph and Popp 2007).
Compared to the previous study, with a more simple judgment task, subjects here may be more likely to see the
negatives in both candidates and have a harder time choosing who to side with. With this constructive processing task,
we should see an influence of negative affective language on how individuals arrive at judgments.

19

Full text available in Appendix A.
The articles were roughly 275 words long in this study, meaning approximately 13% of the words in the treatment article were negatively valenced
words.
21
Responses were on a five point scale, ranging from 0-4. For the negative affect measure, values theoretically range from 0 (no negative affect)
to 20 (highest negative affect). Cronbach’s α = .89.
22
Results presented are difference of means or difference of proportions tests. Models estimated using OLS and controls for race, age, gender,
partisanship and ideology produce substantively and statistically similar results.
23
There is no predictable pattern for what characteristics predict negative responses about either candidate, other than Hispanics than non-Hispanics
make more negative comments about Spencer, and women make more negative comments than men about Thomas. Partisanship or ideology do
not predict negative evaluations of either candidate.
20
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(Table IV about here)
The results in table IV24 demonstrate that negative affective language does indeed have consequences for information
processing and cognitive effort. When subjects are asked to list their thoughts about the election, those in the negative
affective language condition write approximately 25 characters more over the three response options. They also spend
about 12 seconds longer (69 seconds, compared to 57 for the control group) answering these prompts, though this
difference is completely mediated by the increased length of their responses. Open ended responses were coded in a
manner similar to study 1, with a focus on recall of information, mention of outside information, and negative
responses to the candidates.
Negative affective language increases the recall of factual information; roughly 24% of subjects in the treatment group
mentioned a fact from the introduction about the candidates in their three memory responses, while only 18% of the
neutral language group did. Those who read the article with negative affective language also mentioned external
considerations more often, with 32% mentioning a topic not supplied in the article as coming to mind when they think
of the election, compared to just 22% of the control group. Here, subjects typically mentioned other politicians they
were reminded of (the most mentioned were John McCain and Mitt Romney), other political scandals, or drew
conclusions about either candidate’s partisanship. Subjects in the negative affective language treatment also provided
harsher assessments of both candidates in their open-ended responses, despite not rating the candidates differently on
the feeling thermometer. Roughly 19% in the treatment group made at least one negative comment about Spencer in
their open-ended responses, and 25% made a negative comment about Thomas, compared to only 13% and 18%,
respectively, in the control group. Negative sentiment about Spencer often called him a liar, corrupt, and out of touch
with the average citizen. Thomas, meanwhile, was often characterized as immature, desperate, and unwilling to focus
on the issues. Here, we do see some evidence that affect is influencing evaluations of the candidates; those exposed
to negative affective language have more negative things to say about both candidates 25. This suggests that individuals
are thinking about their likes and dislikes of the two candidates, and that reading an article with negative language
leads to more dislikes about both candidates, even though this effect did not appear in the previous, more direct
measures.
Of course, there are limitations to the inferences that can be drawn from this study. While subjects received the same
background information about both candidates in the fictional election, Spencer, the attackee, was a considerably more
experienced candidate than Thomas, the attacker. While feeling thermometer ratings of the two candidates did not
differ, subjects were more likely to provide negative open-ended comments about Thomas than Spencer, regardless
of assignment to the treatment group. This may suggest that negative affective language leads to more negative
evaluations generally, as shown in Study 1, or it may lead to more negative evaluations of the candidate being accused,
but only lead to increased negative evaluations if the accuser if individuals do not especially care for the candidate to
begin with. Further work is needed to adjudicate these effects. 26
Summary and Conclusions
These findings provide insight into how the words used by the news media and politicians can influence political
decision making. In an ideal world, word choice should not be relevant to how citizens evaluate politics and develop
political attitudes. However, word choice is certainly deliberate – politicians use rhetoric strategically in ways that
they believe will increase the general public’s support of them (Riker 1996). If what politicians say is important, how
they say it should be important as well. When presented with information highlighting the negatives of a proposed
policy, individuals evaluate the policy more negatively when the article includes negative affective language. In
accordance with how affect infusion should work in a heuristic processing scenario, they also evaluate a politician
opposed to the policy more harshly, even though they are more in agreement with his policy stance. However, there
is no effect of affective language on recall of information, mention of external information or negative responses
toward the policy, suggesting affect is merely used as a heuristic. Here, subjects evaluate the policy more negatively
when asked for a quick judgment, but are not more likely to express a negative opinion when asked to elaborate on

24

These results are robust to regression controlling for demographic characteristics.
However, there are clear limitations to this study. Typically, individuals do not engage in decision making about candidates without a partisan
cue, as they were forced to in this study. That said, the study may be especially applicable to competitive primaries, as primary elections with
quality challengers and no incumbents are more prone to negativity (Peterson and Djupe 2005).
26
I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the potential for this effect.
25
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what they think of the policy. This suggests that negative affective language can create a mood that is available for a
quick judgment, in this scenario of heuristic processing, but this effect may not persist for long, as the policy is not
judged any more negatively in memory.
In contrast, exposure to negative affective language in a constructive processing task leads to negative reactions in
memory. Here, a scenario where accusations are made between two political candidates leads to more negative
evaluations of both candidates in open-ended cognitive responses when negative affective language is used, even
though there is no difference in feeling thermometer ratings. This suggests that the consequences of negative affective
language may be longer term in more difficult cognitive tasks. It seems that information may be encoded into memory
differently when negative affective words are present, leading to longer lasting effects. This comports with predictions
of both the Affect Infusion Model (Forgas 1995) and Kahneman’s system 2 information processing model (2011).
Taken together, these results suggest that, while affective language operates differently based on the challenge of the
information processing task, it has important consequences in general for how individuals process information and
arrive at political decisions.
Politicians, it seems, may need to be careful about using affectively charged language when making accusations. In
this study, subjects reported more negative responses to the politician accusing misconduct compared to the one
accused of misconduct, and these negative feelings were more prevalent when affective language was used. This
suggests that affectively charged mudslinging may be less effective, as it damages both the attacker and the attackee.
Of course, it is still possible that affective language is considered to be stronger negative information than neutral
language, suggesting that the strength of the language is what is causing these results. Given the difference in results
between study 1 and study 2, I believe that this is not the case. If negative affective language was simply a stronger
information signal than neutral language, it would be difficult to explain the divergent results among the two studies.
If negative language serves as more negative information, evaluations should be harsher regardless of processing style
or measurement type. There are distinct differences in how affect influences political decision making depending upon
the scenario, which aligns nicely with the predictions of the Affect Infusion Model. Taking these two studies together,
I believe that negative mood, rather than negative information, is the route through which negative affective language
influences political judgments.
It is important to consider how long these effects persist. While existing psychological theories suggest that, in
constructive processing tasks, affect should influence how information is coded in memory, I am unable to test this
prediction long term. Future work should focus on the effects of affective language over the periods of days, weeks,
and months, to test this prediction.
Politicians are often in close elections, and may be looking for any avenue possible to increase support and ensure
their election. My findings present an interesting “Catch-22” for politicians: using negative affective language can
decrease support for a policy they don’t like, but this appears to come at the expense of increasing negative evaluations
of the politician who is also associated with these negative words. However, in heuristic processing scenarios, this
effect does not seem to persist very long. Politicians are also faced with a dilemma, though, when attacking their
opponents, and perhaps one that is more damaging. The use of affective language in the context of negative
campaigning does increase negative opinions about the target of the negative campaign, but it also increases negative
opinions about the accuser, as well. In situations where individuals must engage in deeper processing of political
information, such as when they must determine whether negative accusations in a political campaign are true or not,
mood congruence does appear to occur in memory about the candidates. In the context of real political campaigns,
this might suggest that politicians are better off using Super PACs to levy attacks against their opponent, to avoid
association with the negative advertising and the consequences for judgments that come along with it.
This work also has implications for mass polarization. If individuals differ in how they get their political information,
and certain types of information are more affect laden, my research suggests that those who receive emotional content
will become more polarized in their political attitudes. Given self-selection into agreeable political information (Mutz
2006), emotional content may serve to widen the gap between liberals and conservatives, leaving those who consume
less emotional media somewhere in the middle. This proposition is interesting, but may be difficult to test. It is still
important to consider how different sources of political information can influence judgments.
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There has also been considerable debate about the effects of negative advertising, with some arguing it has negative
consequences (see Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995), and others arguing it has positive consequences (see Geer 2006).
I add to that by suggesting that we need to go beyond the study of the message of an advertisement, but also on how
it is delivered. With incivility on the rise (Herbst 2010), attacks could become more vitriolic and include more negative
affective words. In this instance, it is important to consider how negativity can be enhanced and influenced by the type
of language used.
How individuals receive and process political information, and how that influences their evaluations of political
objects, have important consequences for politics generally. I present results that suggest that when individuals are
exposed to language that makes them feel generally negative, they also feel more negatively towards the political
objects presented along with this language.
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Table I. Effect of Negative Affective Language on Political Attitudes - Study 1
Support for Voter ID Law
-6.97*
(3.43)

Support for Ben Griffin
-4.78*
(2.82)

52.58**
(6.29)

-11.03*
(5.17)

Age

-0.31*
(0.15)

-0.03
(0.12)

Female

-3.98
(3.62)

0.03
(2.98)

Education

5.90
(8.62)

3.28
(7.09)

Income

11.42*
(6.78)

-8.62+
(5.57)

African-American

-1.40
(7.09)

1.43
(5.83)

-15.60*
(8.24)

-10.22+
(6.77)

Other Race

-4.55
(6.16)

4.33
(5.07)

Unemployed

-6.91+
(4.78)

3.03
(3.93)

Student

9.35*
(5.38)

0.25
(4.42)

Political Knowledge

3.71
(6.52)

0.44
(5.36)

Lives in State with Voter ID
Law

4.48
(3.73)

-3.48
(3.07)

27.45**
(9.76)

62.59**
(8.02)

Negative Affective Language
Conservative Ideology

Hispanic

Constant

N
307
R2
0.2688
Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, one tailed
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Table II. Effect of Negative Affective Language on Cognitive Elaboration – Study 1

Length of responses
in characters

Proportion
mentioning topic not
in article

Proportion
mentioning fact from
article

Proportion
mentioning negative
opinion of law

Neutral Language

129.98
(7.36)

0.56
(0.04)

0.25
(0.04)

0.46
(0.04)

Negative Language

129.49
(7.26)

0.54
(0.04)

0.28
(0.04)

0.42
(0.04)

Difference

-0.49
(10.34)

-0.02
(0.06)

0.03
(0.05)

-0.04
(0.06)

t

-0.047

-0.27

0.49

-0.74

N
316
316
316
Table entries are means or proportions for each group with standard errors in parenthesis.
+- p<.10, * - p<.05, ** - p<.01, one-tailed

316

Table III. Effect of Negative Affective Language on Political Evaluations – Study 2

Self-Reported
Negative Affect

FT Evaluation –
Arthur Spencer

FT Evaluation – Eric
Thomas

Proportion voting for
Spencer

Neutral Language

7.26
(0.25)

46.64
(1.30)

48.02
(1.15)

0.49
(0.03)

Negative Language

7.83
(0.27)

47.81
(1.32)

49.89
(1.22)

0.51
(0.03)

Difference

0.57+
(0.36)

1.17
(1.85)

1.87
(1.68)

-0.02
(0.05)

t

1.58

0.63

1.11

0.58

N
426
426
426
Table entries are means or proportions for each group with standard errors in parenthesis.
+- p<.10, * - p<.05, ** - p<.01, one-tailed
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Table IV. Effect of Negative Affective Language on Cognitive Elaboration – Study 2

Length of responses
in characters

Proportion
mentioning topic
not in article

Proportion
mentioning fact
from introduction

Proportion
mentioning
negative opinion of
Spencer

Proportion
mentioning negative
opinion of Thomas

Neutral Language

92.45
(5.32)

0.22
(0.03)

0.18
(0.03)

0.13
(0.02)

0.18
(0.03)

Negative Language

117.32
(5.96)

0.32
(0.03)

0.24
(0.03)

0.19
(0.03)

0.25
(0.03)

Difference

24.87**
(4.05)

0.10*
(0.04)

0.06*
(0.04)

0.06+
(0.04)

0.07*
(0.04)

t

2.86

2.32

1.65

1.62

1.75

N
426
426
426
426
Table entries are means or proportions for each group with standard errors in parenthesis.
+- p<.10, * - p<.05, ** - p<.01, one-tailed

426
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Appendix A – Treatment Texts
Study 1
C1: Neutral language condition

C2: Negative affective language condition
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Study 2
Candidate Introduction

C1: Neutral Language Condition
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C2: Negative Affective Language Condition

Appendix B. Balance Checks
Study 1
Control
Conservative Ideology

Treatment

Diff

p

0.4

0.437

-0.037

0.25

35.7

33.3

2.45

0.08

Female

0.552

0.586

-0.034

0.54

Education

0.711

0.703

0.008

0.72

Income

0.503

0.471

0.033

0.27

African-American

0.084

0.037

0.047

0.08

Hispanic

0.045

0.049

-0.004

0.87

Other Race

0.078

0.111

-0.033

0.32

Unemployed

0.169

0.154

0.015

0.73

Student

0.104

0.191

-0.087

0.03

Political Knowledge

0.646

0.633

0.013

0.68

Lives in State with Voter ID Law

0.312

0.302

0.009

0.86

Age

17
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Study 2
Control
Conservative Ideology

Treatment

Diff

p

0.459

0.437

0.02

0.42

26.6

26.8

0.2

0.85

Female

0.529

0.541

-0.012

0.8

Education

0.623

0.619

0.004

0.9

Income

0.558

0.578

-0.02

0.56

African-American

0.067

0.087

-0.02

0.44

Hispanic

0.048

0.078

-0.03

0.21

Trust in Government

0.056

0.513

-0.007

0.73

Age

18

